Abstract-Consider a sender, Alice, who wants to transmit private messages to two receivers, Bob and Calvin, using unreliable wireless broadcast transmissions and short public feedback from Bob and Calvin. In [1], we assumed that Bob and Calvin provide honest feedback, and characterized the secure capacity region of the private messages under the requirement that Bob and Calvin do not learn each other's message. In this paper, we assume that Bob (or Calvin) may provide dishonest feedback; or even control the input message distributions, as is commonly assumed in cryptography literature. We characterize the capacity region in the case of dishonest adversaries, as well as an achievable region for the case when the adversary has complete control on the distribution of the messages. We also design polynomial time protocols for both cases, that rely on the use of coding techniques to mix and secure the private messages. As a side result, we define an extended notion of semantic security for this problem and using a similar approach to [2], we show the equivalence of different security notions.
I. INTRODUCTION
A promising application of network coding in wireless is when a wireless access point, Alice, wants to send private messages to two receivers, Bob and Calvin, who can send back to Alice packet acknowledgments. It is well known in the network coding literature that to achieve the optimal communication rates, Bob and Calvin should try to overhear the packets intended for the other user, while Alice should code across the private packets she has for Calvin and Bob [3] , [4] . However, this rate-optimal scheme seems to come with a security compromise, since Bob and Calvin learn parts of each other's message.
In our work, we are interested in security guarantees we can provide in this setting. As a first step, in [1] we assumed that Calvin and Bob send honest acknowledgments, that correctly report what are the packets they have received, and we characterized what is the capacity region of secure communication in such a broadcast setting. That is, we assumed that Bob (or Calvin) is curious, but still honest -which is an optimistic assumption. In this paper, we look at the more realistic setting where Bob (or Calvin) are no longer honest, and try to deceive Alice on what are the packets he correctly received. Moreover, following security definitions in the cryptography literature, we also look at the case where Bob (or Calvin) may even control the input message distributions that Alice sends. For the case of a dishonest user, we provide a complete capacity characterization, as well as a polynomial time achievability algorithm that leverages coding techniques. Our achievability protocol uses coding and feedback to exploit three aspects of wireless: (i) Alice can broadcast; (ii) Bob and Calvin will not receive exactly the same broadcast packets due to channel errors and (iii) each of them passively collects information about the other's (encrypted) message. Clearly, if a user dishonestly reports what are the messages he has correctly received, we cannot offer guarantee on the message rates he will experience; our guarantees are for the honest receiver. Interestingly, we find that the achievable rate of secure communication to the honest receiver is not affected by the dishonest acknowledging of the other receiver.
We also define a stronger notion of security and design a scheme that is secure independently of the joint distribution of the messages, i.e., the adversary might even choose this distribution arbitrarily. Building on the approach of [2] we show equivalence of our security definitions with other notions of security that are used more commonly in the realm of cryptography.
Related work: Secure transmission of messages using noisy channel properties was pioneered by Wyner [5] , who characterized the secret message capacity of wiretap channels. This led to a long sequence of research on information-theoretic security on various generalizations of the wiretap channel [6] , [7] . Notably, when the eavesdropper and legitimate channel are statistically identical, then the wiretap framework yields no security. The fact that feedback can give security even in this case was first observed for secret key agreement by Maurer [8] and further developed by Ahlswede-Csiszár [9] -but secure key agreement is not the same as secure transmission of specific messages. The wiretap channel with secure feedback and its variants for message security have been studied in [10] , [11] . The use of feedback and broadcast for private message transmission, without security requirements has been studied in [3] , [4] .
Closest to the current work are [12] and [1] . In [12] the secret message capacity of a single receiver broadcast channel against a passive eavesdropper was established. As mentioned earlier, [1] investigates a similar setting but with a much more restrictive adversary model.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a three party communication setting with one sender (Alice) and two receivers (Bob and Calvin). The goal of Alice is to securely send private messages W 1 and W 2 to Bob and Calvin, such that the receivers may not learn each other's messages.
Alice employs a memoryless erasure broadcast channel defined as follows. The inputs of the channel are length L vectors over F q , which we call sometimes packets. The ith input is denoted by X i . The ith output of the channel seen by Bob is Y 1,i , while the output seen by Calvin is Y 2,i . The broadcast channel consists of two independent erasure channels towards Bob and Calvin. We note that our assumption on independence eases presentation, but it is not crucial in deriving our results. We denote δ 1 the erasure probability of Bob's channel and δ 2 that of Calvin's channel. More precisely,
where ⊥ is the symbol of an erasure. Assumptions: We assume that the receivers send public acknowledgments after each transmission stating whether or not they received the transmission correctly. By public we mean that the acknowledgments are available not only for Alice but for the other receiver as well.
We assume that some authentication method prevents the receivers from forging each other's acknowledgments. Also, we assume that both Bob and Calvin only know each other's acknowledgments causally, after they have revealed their own.
Let S i denote the state of the channel in the ith transmission, S i ∈ {B, C, BC, ∅} corresponding to the receptions "Bob only", "Calvin only", "Both" and "None", respectively. Further, S * i denotes the state based on the acknowledgments sent by Bob and Calvin. If both users report honestly, then S i = S * i . We denote as S i the vector that collects all the states up to the ith, i.e., S i = [S 1 . . . S i ], and similarly for S * i . Beside the communication capability as described above, all users can securely generate private randomness. We denote by Θ A , Θ B and Θ C the private random strings Alice, Bob, and Calvin, respectively have access to. All parties have perfect knowledge of the communication model.
A. Security and reliability requirements
An (n, ǫ, N 1 , N 2 ) scheme sends N 1 packets of length L to Bob and N 2 to Calvin using n transmissions from Alice with error probability smaller than ǫ. Formally: 
Dishonest user: We will say that a user is dishonest if the user can (a) select the marginal distribution of the other user's message arbitrarily; his own message is assumed to be independent of the other user's message and uniformly distributed over its alphabet and the dishonest user does not have (a priori) access to his own message, and (b) produce dishonest acknowledgments as a (potentially randomized) function of all the information he has access to when producing each acknowledgment (this includes all the packets and the pattern of erasures he received up to and including the current packet he is acknowledging and the acknowledgments sent by the other user over the public channel up to the previous packet). In the following σ denotes the dishonest user's acknowledging strategy.
Note that at most one of the receivers can be dishonest. Indeed, if a user is dishonest, we cannot guarantee that his private messages will remain secure from the other user; thus if both users are dishonest the problem is not meaningful.
It is common to define the advantage of the adversary (in our case a dishonest user), which measures the gain that the adversary obtains by observing a protocol. We express the adversarial advantage Adv mis in terms of mutual information (mis = mutual information security). We discuss the relation between different security definitions in Section II-B.
is said to be secure against a dishonest user, if it guarantees decodability and security for an honest user even if the other user is dishonest (as defined above). That is, if Bob is honest, then (2) and
are satisfied, and if Calvin is honest, then (3) and
are satisfied. The maxima are taken over all adversarial acknowledging strategies and all possible distributions P W1 or P W2 of the corresponding message. The secret message capacity region R ⊂ R 2 + is the set of all rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ), such that for every ǫ, ǫ ′ > 0 there are N 1 and N 2 and a large enough n for which there exists an (n, ǫ, N 1 , N 2 ) scheme that is secure against a dishonest user and
Clearly a scheme which is secure against a dishonest user is also secure against honest (but curious) users since the dishonest user may choose to acknowledge truthfully.
When defining security against a dishonest user (Definition 2), we assumed that the dishonest user cannot control his own message distribution. Relaxing this assumption leads to a stronger notion of security. We define the adversarial advantage Adv mis dis (dis = distribution independent security) for this case.
Definition 3. An (n, ǫ, N 1 , N 2 ) scheme is said to provide distribution independent security, if it guarantees decodability and security for the honestly acknowledging user (or users) independently of the joint distribution P W1,W2 of (W 1 , W 2 ). That is, if Bob is honest, (2) and
are satisfied. A rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) belongs to the rate region R dis if for every ǫ, ǫ ′ > 0 there are N 1 and N 2 and a large enough n for which there exists an (n, ǫ, N 1 , N 2 ) scheme that provides distribution independent security and
B. Security notions
We formulate our results in information theoretic terms, defining secrecy as a mutual information term being negligibly small. In the realm of cryptography it is more common to prove security of an encryption scheme by showing distinguishing security or semantic security. To facilitate the interpretation of our results and to allow a fair comparison with other schemes, we cite a recent result from [2] , which shows equivalence between the two approaches. By this, our definition of security against a dishonest user is equivalent to semantic security. We also extend the notion of semantic security such that it handles joint message distributions, which results in a definition matching distribution independent security. We will give the definitions for Bob's security, the security for Calvin is completely symmetric.
The notion of semantic security captures the intuition that an adversary should not learn anything useful about the message. In other words, the probability that the adversary can compute a function f of the message should not increase significantly after observing the protocol compared to the a priori probability of a correct guess. The semantic security advantage is defined as
where f is any function of W 1 , A is any function the adversary may compute after observing the protocol and S is a simulator trying to compute f without accessing the protocol output.
Here also, W 2 is uniformly distributed and independent of W 1 . The term simulator to denote guessing functions comes from the intuition that ideally there exists an algorithm (simulator) that simulates the run of a protocol without having access to the message and whose output is indistinguishable from the output of a real protocol. is also small. The above discussion assumed that Calvin cannot choose the distribution of his own message W 2 . We now extend the above definition of semantic security such that it does not rely on the distribution of W 2 , which results a stronger notion of security. We define the adversarial advantage for this case as
Note that here we allow the simulator to have access to the message W 2 which an honest Calvin will learn. We show the following lemma which implies that requirement (7) is equivalent to this extended notion of semantic security. Due to space constraints we give the proof in the extended version of this paper [13] . This lemma suggests that our results on mutual information security (see Theorems 1-2 in the next section) also a characterize the rate region for semantic security.
III. MAIN RESULT Theorem 1. The secret message capacity region as defined in Definition 2 is the set of all rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R 2 + which satisfy the following two inequalities:
We prove Theorem 1 in two steps. First, we provide a protocol in Section IV and show that this protocol achieves all the rate pairs in the capacity region. We then apply the converse proof developed for the weaker honest-but-curious security definition to get an upper bound. The two regions match, i.e., a dishonest user cannot deteriorate the performance experienced by an honest user. The first term of (11) and (12) can be interpreted as the overhead for security, because -as we will see soon -it corresponds to the duration of a secret key generation phase. Omitting these terms gives us the capacity region for the message transmission problem with two users without any secrecy requirements [4] .
In the case of distribution independent security we do not have a complete characterization: we construct a scheme that satisfies this stronger security definition, however its optimality is not clear. The next theorem gives the rate region achieved by our scheme.
Theorem 2. If a rate pair
(R 1 , R 2 ) satisfies R 1 (1 − δ 2 ) δ 2 (1 − δ 1 )(1 − δ 1 δ 2 ) + R 2 (1 − δ 1 ) δ 1 (1 − δ 2 )(1 − δ 1 δ 2 ) + R 1 1 − δ 1 + R 2 1 − δ 1 δ 2 ≤ L log q,(13)R 1 (1 − δ 2 ) δ 2 (1 − δ 1 )(1 − δ 1 δ 2 ) + R 2 (1 − δ 1 ) δ 1 (1 − δ 2 )(1 − δ 1 δ 2 ) + R 1 1 − δ 1 δ 2 + R 2 1 − δ 2 ≤ L log q. (14) then (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R dis .
IV. PROTOCOL FOR DISHONEST RECEIVERS
We describe an (n, ǫ, N 1 , N 2 ) scheme that is secure against a dishonest user as defined in Definition 2. In our new scheme we bring together ideas that secure message transmission in the presence of an adversary and ideas that allow efficient transmissions for multiple parties.
Main steps: We apply a two-phase approach introduced first in [12] . Alice attempts to send N 1 message packets W 1 = (W 1,1 , W 1,2 , . . . , W 1,N1 ) to Bob and W 2 = (W 2,1 , W 2,2 , . . . , W 2,N2 ) to Calvin using at most n packet transmissions.
I. Key generation. Alice sends uniform i.i.d. random packets over the channel. From the acknowedged packets, secret key packets between Alice-Bob and between Alice-Calvin are set up such that Bob's key is secret from Calvin and Calvin's key is secret from Bob. Privacy amplification [14] , [15] is used to ensure security of the keys. II. Message encryption and transmission. Alice encrypts the messages using the key packets and reliably transmits them to the two receivers. The encryption operation is a simple XOR with the encryption key packets, however the encryption key packets are not independent. Instead, they are produced from the secret key packets using a maximum distance separable (MDS) code. This allows efficient usage of the keys [12] . In both phases we rely on channel properties and exploit that neither receiver receives all transmitted packets. This allows both efficient key generation and efficient (in terms of key size) encryption. Previous work [12] has shown that it is sufficient to know the expected behavior of the channel, there is no need to know exactly which packets are received by an adversary.
To illustrate, consider the key generation phase. Assume that Alice transmits three random (independent and uniformly distributed) packets X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , and assume Bob receives X 1 , X 2 , while Calvin receives X 2 , X 3 . If we could rely on Bob and Calvin's honesty, we could then assign K B = X 1 as a secret key between Alice and Bob, while K C = X 3 as the key between Alice and Calvin. If we cannot rely on Bob and Calvin's honesty, but we do know that Bob and Calvin have received at most one packet in common, we could allocate K B = X 1 ⊕ X 2 as the key between Alice-Bob, and K C = X 2 ⊕ X 3 as the Alice-Calvin key.
Note that although similar techniques are used in [1] , [12] , none of these previous schemes can handle an adversary who -being a legitimate receiver -has some control over the protocol run and who can also actively deviate from the protocol. To summarize, our new scheme has the following distinguishing features: 1) In the key generation phase the set of packets we use to compute the keys for Bob and for Calvin are not disjunct, still keys are secure. 2) Although Calvin can influence the run of the protocol, we ensure that independently of his acknowledging strategy, he cannot control how many times a given encrypted packet with Bob's message appears on the channel. From this property it follows that we can estimate accurately the number of packets Calvin overhears which makes it possible to use an encryption similar to [12] . 3) In the second phase we need coding to make transmissions maximally useful for both users as seen in [4] . Alice can send an XOR-ed packet only if both receivers have a side information packet. However, a dishonest user might deny having a side information packet and hinder these coded transmissions. In our scheme we apply a round robin type scheduling to ensure that dishonest feedback cannot diminish the rate experienced by the other user.
A. Protocol description
Parameters: The operation of the protocol utilizes a set of parameters which we can directly calculate before the protocol starts, and whose use will be described in the following.
Key Generation 1) Alice transmits n 1 packets X 1 , . . . , X n1 . She generates these packets uniformly at random from F L q using her private randomness, and independently of W 1 , W 2 . 2) Bob and Calvin acknowledge which packets they have received. If Bob receives less than k 1 packets we declare a protocol error for him. Similarly for Calvin if he receives less than k 2 packets. When an error is declared for both users, the protocol terminates. If not, we continue with the user not in error, as if the user in error did not exist.
3) Let X B 1 be a L × k 1 matrix that has as columns the first k 1 packets that Bob acknowledged. Alice and Bob create k B secret key packets as K B = X B 1 G KB , where G KB is a (k 1 × k B ) matrix and is a parity check matrix of a (k 1 , k 1 − k B ) MDS code. Similarly, using the first k 2 packets that Calvin acknowledges, Alice and Calvin create k C secret key packets using the matrix G KC . Matrices G KB , G KC are publicly known and fixed in advance.
Message encryption and transmission
is a (k B × N 1 ) matrix and is a generator matrix of an (N 1 , k B ) MDS code which is also publicly known. Similarly, Alice and Calvin create N 2 linear combinations of their k C key packets. 5) Alice creates N 1 encrypted messages to send to Bob
where ⊕ is addition in the F L q vector space. Let U B denote the set of U B,i , i = 1, . . . , N 1 . She similarly produces a set U C of N 2 encrypted messages to send to Calvin. Encrypted transmissions 6) Alice sequentially takes the first encrypted packet from U B,i , i = 1 . . . N 1 , that is not yet acknowledged by Bob and repeatedly transmits it, until there is one that only Calvin acknowledges. That is, if at time i Alice transmits X i = U B,j for some j < N 1 , then
Let Q B denote the last transmitted packet of this step, i.e., the first such packet that only Calvin acknowledges. If there is no such packet, Q B is empty. 7) Similarly, Alice sends the first not-yet-acknowledged (by Calvin) encrypted packet from U C,i , i = 1 . . . N 2 , until there is one that only Bob acknowledges. If at time i Alice transmits X i = U C,j for some j < N 2 , then
Let Q C denote the first such packet that only Bob acknowledges. If there is no such packet, Q C is empty. 8) Alice transmits the sum of the two undelivered packets: Q B ⊕ Q C . If Q B or Q C is empty, then Alice sends the non-empty packet. If both Q B and Q C are empty, then both messages W 1 and W 2 are successfully delivered and we stop. If at time i Alice sends X i , then
then repeat steps 6 and 8. if S * i = C, then repeat steps 7 and 8. if S * i = BC, then repeat steps 6, 7 and 8.
(23)
If at any point, the overall number of transmissions would exceed n as defined in (20) we stop and declare an error for the party (or parties) who has not acknowledged all his encrypted message packets.
B. Protocol analysis
We prove that the presented scheme is secure against a dishonest user as defined in Definition 2 and runs without error with high probability. We use lemmas whose proofs are provided in [13] . A simple calculation with the given parameters shows that it achieves any rate pair in the the region defined by (11)- (12).
1) Security:
In our argument we focus on the secrecy of W 1 against a dishonest Calvin, but the same reasoning works for W 2 against a dishonest Bob as well.
To analyze the secrecy of W 1 , we may, without loss of generality, assume that no error was declared for Bob during the key generation phase. Recall that an error is declared for Bob only if Bob fails to acknowledge at least k 1 packets. If an error was in fact declared for Bob, no information about Bob's message W 1 is ever transmitted by Alice. However, note that we do account for this error event when we analyze the probability of error for Bob (Section IV-B2).
We first show that I(K B ; Y n1 2 S n1 ) can be made small, i.e., the key generation phase is secure. The key facts we use in proving this lemma are (i) the number of packets seen by Calvin concentrates around its mean and (ii) an MDS parity check matrix can be used to perform privacy amplification in the packet erasure setting.
Lemma 2. When Bob is honest and no error is declared for Bob in the key generation phase,
We still need to show that the secrecy condition is satisfied by the scheme even if Calvin chooses any message distribution P W1 and applies any acknowledging strategy, i.e., (4) holds. In the proof we omit taking the maximum, but the argument holds for any message distribution and any adversarial strategy, so the statement follows. We have
where the inequality used the fact that Θ A , Θ C , W 2 , S n are independent of W 1 and we may express Y n1 2 , U C as deterministic functions of Θ A , Θ C , W 2 , S n . Let M C B be the random variable which denotes the number of distinct packets of U B that Calvin observes either in its pure form or in a form where the U B,i packet is added with some U C,j packet. We have the following two lemmas:
Using these in (25), we have
Lemma 2 gives a bound for the second term. We can bound the first term using concentration inequalities. Notice that the probability that Calvin overhears a packet U B,i (where we count overhearing in both pure form or as part of a linear combination), is , by applying ChernoffHoeffding bound we have
for a constant c 2 > 0. Substituting this together with Lemma 2 in (27) we get
for constants c 1 , c 2 > 0. By choosing a large enough value of N 1 , we may meet (4).
2) Error probability: An error happens if (a) Bob receives less than k 1 packets in the first phase, or (b) he does not receive N 1 encrypted message packets in steps 6 and 8 before the protocol terminates. Both these error events have the same nature. An error happens if Bob collects significantly fewer packets than he is expected to receive in a particular step. We apply Chernoff-Hoeffding bound as we did to show the security guarantee proving that the probability of these events can be made arbitrarily small. We omit details to avoid parallel arguments.
3) Optimality: We can assume that both Bob and Calvin are honest and apply the converse proof developed in [1] (Theorem 4 in [1] ). Obviously, this is a valid upper bound in the case of a dishonest user as well. With this we prove optimality and complete the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 3. Any achievable rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R as defined in Definition 2 satisfies inequalities (11) and (12).
V. DISTRIBUTION INDEPENDENT SCHEME
In the following we describe a scheme which satisfies the stronger security notion as defined in Definition 3. The protocol of Section IV cannot satisfy distribution independent security, because if Calvin knows his message a priori, then U C carries information about the packets used in the key generation phase, hence potentially giving him extra information about Bob's key. We can overcome this issue if we modify the key generation phase and make sure that no packet used in generating Calvin's key contributes to Bob's key, thus U C is conditionally independent of Bob's key given Calvin's observation of the protocol and W 2 . This results in two separate key generation phases, one for Bob and one for Calvin.
Instead of sending n 1 key generation packets as defined in (17), we have a key generation of length n * 1 + n * 2 , where
. Bob's key is then computed from the first n * 1 packets, while Calvin's key is computed from the next n * 2 packets. All other parameters remain the same as in Section IV and the second phase remains unchanged too.
This scheme provides distribution independent security, which property is proved formally in [13] . A straightforward rate calculation completes the proof of Theorem 2.
